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Abstract 
In 2011, the Government of Ethiopia launched a pilot Community-Based 
Health Insurance (CBHI) scheme. This paper uses three rounds of household 
survey data, collected before and after the introduction of the CBHI pilot, to 
assess the impact of the scheme on household consumption, income, 
indebtedness and livestock holdings. We∗ find that enrolment leads to a 5 
percentage point – or 13 percent – decline in the probability of borrowing and 
is associated with an increase in household income. There is no evidence that 
enrolling in the scheme affects consumption or livestock holdings. Our results 
show that the scheme reduces reliance on potentially harmful coping responses 
such as borrowing. This paper adds to the relatively small body of work which 
rigorously evaluates the impact of CBHI schemes on economic welfare. 
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1. Introduction 
Various forms of health insurance have been advocated as market based risk-transfer 
mechanisms with the potential to guard against the impoverishing effects of ill-health (see 
Gertler and Gruber 2002, Xu et al. 2003, Asfaw and Von Braun 2004, Leive and Xu 2008). 
The recent proliferation of Community Based Health Insurance (CBHI) schemes in many 
developing countries emanates partly from a need to provide financial protection against 
unexpected health care costs and to enhance access to modern health care. As a prelude to 
national coverage, in June 2011, the Ethiopian Government introduced a pilot CBHI scheme 
in thirteen Woredas (districts) across the four main regional states that constitute 86 percent 
of the population (Population Census Commission, 2008).
1
 The aim of this paper is to 
examine the impact of this scheme on measures of household economic welfare: 
consumption, income, indebtedness and livestock.  
The economic burden associated with the incidence of ill-health has been documented in a 
recent but rapidly growing literature on poverty dynamics. Most of these studies examine the 
consumption implications of health shocks while some delve into the portfolio of coping 
responses adopted by households.
2
 A number of studies show that households in the informal 
rural sector rely on traditional coping responses such as selling assets and informal borrowing 
to deal with the adverse consequences of ill-health (Heltberg and Lund 2009, Dekker and 
Wilms 2010, Sparrow et al. 2014, Yilma et al. 2014). These coping responses are not cost 
free but entail a compromise – protecting current consumption at the cost of future 
vulnerability (Flores et al. 2008).  
Health insurance primarily addresses out-of-pocket health expenditure, one of two sources 
of household financial stress from ill health. The second source is forgone income due to 
                                                          
1
 This came following a successful low-cost health service extension program designed to increase the 
supply of preventive and basic curative health services.  See its impact evaluation in Admassie et al. 
(2009). 
2
 See, amongst others, Gertler and Gruber 2002, Wagstaff 2007, Wagstaff and Lindelow 2010, Islam 
and Maitra 2010, Genoni 2012, Sparrow et al. 2013, Mohanan 2013. 
3 
 
declining capacity to work. While health insurance schemes are not designed to curb this 
source of vulnerability, they might still provide some protection to households’ agricultural 
income by facilitating early recovery and by reducing pressure on households to reallocate 
resources meant for productive purposes (for instance, to buy fertilizers and high value seeds) 
to medical spending. By reducing reliance on potentially harmful coping responses, such as 
borrowing at usurious rates, health insurance schemes might protect household’s economic 
welfare both in the short and the long-run.  
Although analyses of the impact of health insurance has been the subject of a large body 
of empirical literature, much of this work has focused on health care utilization and out-of-
pocket (OOP) health expenditure or on induced behavioural responses such as moral hazard 
(Leon 2012). Reviews of the literature by Ekman (2004) and Mebratie et al. (2013a) conclude 
that the evidence base is questionable with regard to the financial protection provided by 
CBHI. The bulk of the CBHI evaluation literature, with few exceptions
3
, relies on cross-
section based association and does not identify causal effects. Ignoring self-selection in 
voluntary insurance uptake is likely to lead to biased estimates of the impact of CBHI. 
Moreover, while there are studies that examine whether health insurance helps protect 
income or wealth from declining due to ill-health (Levy 2002, Lindelow and Wagstaff 2005) 
or have studied the effect of such schemes on consumption (Wagstaff and Pradhan 2005), 
there are relatively few studies that have evaluated the impact of such schemes on 
indebtedness and livestock.  
This paper uses three rounds of household panel data – a baseline and two follow-up 
surveys. The presence of a baseline survey enables us to examine self-selection and to control 
for both observable and unobservable time invariant factors which may affect self-selection. 
                                                          
3
 Jowett et al. (2003) for Vietnam, Levine et al. (2014) for Cambodia and Lu et al. (2012) for Rwanda, 
find statistically significant negative effects of CBHI on OOP health spending. Wagstaff et al. (2009) 
find no statistically significant effects for China. 
4 
 
To identify the effect of the scheme on income, consumption, livestock and indebtedness we 
rely on both fixed effects and matching methods and compare results for different control 
groups (within and across pilot and non-pilot districts).   
We find that enrolment in the CBHI scheme decreases the probability of indebtedness by 
13 percent. We also find a negative, yet imprecise, effect on the amount of outstanding loans. 
There is no statistically significant impact on livestock holding and consumption. However, 
crop output and total income increase by 9 to 10 percent of baseline values. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two provides the context and 
design of the CBHI scheme. Section three describes the data. This is followed by a brief 
discussion on the how the scheme may be expected to influence outcomes. Section five 
describes the empirical approach and section six presents the results. Finally, section seven 
concludes.   
2. CBHI scheme design 
In June 2011, as part of the new health sector financing reform (HSFR) initiatives, the 
Ethiopian Government launched a pilot CBHI scheme in 13 districts in the four main regions 
(Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya, and SNNPR) of the country.
4,5 
Regional administrative bodies 
selected these districts based on directives provided by the Federal Ministry of Health 
(FMoH). The selection criteria require that the districts fulfil five conditions while in practice 
selection was based on two conditions: undertaking HSFRs and geographical accessibility of 
health centers (located close to the main road).
6
  
 
                                                          
4
 Although initially the plan was to launch the pilot scheme in 3 districts in each of the four regions, 
an additional district in Oromiya region volunteered to join the pilot scheme and was included.  
5 
The main components of the health sector financing reform include revenue retention and utilization 
by health facilities, fee waiver and exemption of certain services, and establishment of private wings 
in public hospitals. 
6
 The complete set of selection criteria include (1) Willingness of district authorities to implement the 
scheme (2) Commitment of districts to support the scheme, (3) Geographical accessibility of health 
centers (4) Quality of health centers, (5) The implementation of cost recovery, local revenue retention, 
and public pharmacy policies in health centers. 
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The community element to the CBHI scheme is that villages (Kebeles) decide whether or 
not to join (based on a simple majority vote), and are subsequently involved in management 
and supervision. Possibly due to prior sensitization activities, all villages in pilot districts 
voted in favour of the scheme. Once a Kebele agrees to join, household enrolment is 
voluntary. To reduce adverse selection, enrolment is at the household level rather than the 
individual (FMoH 2008). 
Benefit packages, registration fees, premiums and premium payment methods are similar 
within regions but vary slightly across regions (Table 1).
7
 While in Amhara region the unit of 
contribution is the individual (ETB 3 per individual per month) in other regions it is the 
household. For core household members (parents and minor children), household level 
monthly premiums range between ETB 10.50 in SNNPR to ETB 15 in Oromiya (Table 1). 
For each additional non-core household member the monthly premium lies between ETB 
2.10 and ETB 3.00.  On average, the combined premiums for core household members 
(parents and underage children) amount to about 1-1.4 percent of household monthly non-
medical expenditure.
8
 The CBHI scheme is subsidized by both the central and 
regional/district governments. The central government provides a general subsidy amounting 
to a quarter of the premium collected at district level while the regional and district level 
governments cover the costs of providing a fee waiver for the poorest 10 percent of the 
population.
9
 
The benefit package includes both outpatient and inpatient service utilization at public 
facilities. Enrolled households may not seek care in private facilities unless a particular 
service or drug is unavailable at a public facility. The scheme excludes treatment abroad and 
                                                          
7 The design of the scheme is based on a feasibility study conducted by an international consultancy 
company, Abt Associates, which is also responsible for implementation and monitoring of the scheme 
in collaboration with relevant government bodies at the federal and local level. 
8 
In 2011, monthly household non-medical expenditure was ETB 1103 (USD 1 equals ETB 18).  
9
 These households are categorized as indigent groups (households without land, house, or any 
valuable assets). In December 2012 about 9 percent of total eligible households had received a fee 
waiver. 
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treatments with large cosmetic value such as artificial teeth and plastic surgery. The referral 
procedure requires members to visit health centers before they may be referred to hospitals 
(district or regional). Those who do not follow this referral procedure need to cover half the 
costs of their medical treatment.
10
 In our sample, CBHI uptake reached 41 percent in April 
2012 and 48 percent in 2013 (see Table 1). This is comparable to the official overall figure 
reported by Abt Associates (45.5 percent in December 2012). Although there is not much of a 
difference between uptake in April 2012 (41 percent) and uptake in April 2013 (48 percent), 
the speed of uptake is remarkable compared to experiences in other African countries. Uptake 
in Senegal after two years was 4.8 percent (Smith and Sulzbach, 2008), in Tanzania 2.8 
percent after six years (Chee et al., 2002), in Mali 11.4 percent after six years (Diop et al., 
2006), and in Rwanda 35 percent after seven years and 85 percent after nine years (Shimeles, 
2010).  
3. Data 
We use three-rounds of a household panel data set, collected in March/April of 2011, 2012 
and 2013. The first round was collected a few months before the launch of the CBHI scheme 
and serves as a baseline. Sixteen districts located across four main regions of the country 
(Amhara, Oromiya, Tigray and SNNPR) are included in the survey. For each region we 
include all three districts that implemented the CBHI pilot and one selected non-pilot district. 
The non-pilot districts were chosen based on the same criteria that were used to select the 
pilot districts. Within the districts we applied a two stage sampling design, randomly 
sampling villages (six from each district) and the households (17 from each village). The total 
sample size in the first round is 1,632 households comprising 9,455 individuals, of which 98 
and 97 percent were successfully re-surveyed in 2012 and 2013. 
                                                          
10
 Access to tertiary level care differs across regions. While in Oromiya coverage includes hospitals 
located outside the region, in SNNPR they may visit only the nearest public hospital. In Amhara and 
Tigray, CBHI enrollees may visit any public hospital within the region but not outside the region. 
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The survey instrument contains information on a variety of individual and household 
socio-economic attributes such as consumption expenditure, crop output, off-farm income, 
assets, outstanding loans, household demographics, employment and health conditions. The 
total value of all outstanding loans at the time of the survey is used to measure indebtedness. 
We record the number of various livestock types owned rather than their monetary values. It 
is important to acknowledge that although this is less prone to reporting error, we are not able 
to capture livestock quality and size differences. Our measures of income are value of crop 
output and total income in the past 12 months. The survey asks if a household produced any 
of 33 crop items listed and how much is produced. We calculate the value of crop production 
using the per unit sales price of each item. If the household did not sell that item we rely on 
the median price of that item in the district or zone. Crop output is the sum of the monetary 
value of all items produced in the past year. Total income is the sum of crop output and off-
farm income. Off-farm income is calculated by multiplying the number of days worked in the 
past month with the average cash equivalent remuneration per day. Monthly off-farm income 
is multiplied by 12 to get annualized figures. This is then aggregated at the household level 
before adding it to crop output. Our measure of consumption is monthly non-medical per 
adult equivalent consumption.
11
 The survey collected the quantity and monetary value of 41 
food items consumed in the last week and consumption expenditure on 34 non-food items in 
the past month or year, depending on the item. Both food and non-food consumption 
expenditures are then converted to their monthly equivalents, in per adult equivalent terms.  
In addition to the surveys, we also conducted event history interviews with 42 purposively 
selected households across the four regions. We make occasional references to this 
qualitative information. 
  
                                                          
11 
We adopt the age-sex based adult equivalent household size suggested by Dercon and Krishnan 
(1998). 
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4. CBHI and expected effects  
In principle, since enrollment in CBHI enables access to free care, it might reduce the 
necessity to rely on coping responses that are less preferred by households. For example, 
Yilma et al. (2014) find that borrowing is a last resort used by households primarily to meet 
urgent health care needs.
12
 Hence, we expect access to CBHI to reduce the probability of 
borrowing/indebtedness. Distress sales of livestock to finance urgent health care needs are 
also expected to decline. Hence, we expect an increase in livestock ownership.
13
 The 
possibility that insurance protects households against the income effects of health shocks has 
been noted in China (Lindelow and Wagstaff 2005). There are two ways in which CBHI 
might affect household income. First, it might reduce the negative impact on labor supply by 
facilitating early treatment and fast recovery. Second, as the following quotes suggest, credit 
constrained rural households tend to finance health care using by using cash that has been 
saved for buying fertilizers or seeds. Subsequent delays in production or loss of productivity 
might compromise household income.  
 “My wife is sick of modern illness, TB. She is recurrently sick and goes to health 
facilities quite often. I spent around 5000 birr. Her illness has affected our harvest. 
Because of health expenditure, I couldn’t buy inputs of production (high yield seeds 
and fertilizer) on time and hence, reduced my output. [Male respondent, Oumbulo 
Tenkaka Kebele of SNNPR, Interview conducted on 11
th
 February 2013]” 
 
“My daughter had a stomach complaint for more than a week. I took her to a 
traditional healer but she couldn’t get better. Then, I took her to a health center... I 
spent 300 birr for that. Due to her illness, I didn’t work on my vegetable garden. As I 
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 Yilma et al. (2014) also show that selling assets and relying on savings are prominent responses to 
health shocks in these villages. 
13 
However, if livestock is held as a buffer stock, for unexpected health care needs, the effect of CBHI 
may be negative.  
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used the money I put aside for seeds, I ran out of cash to buy the seeds to plant my 
vegetables. Although, after sometime, I worked off-farm (dig-out sand and sell) and 
planted vegetables, I do not expect as much output as I planted it late. [Male 
respondent, Jara Damuwa Kebele of SNNPR, Interview conducted on 15th of 
February 2013]” 
5. Methods 
The non-random nature of insurance uptake is an important empirical concern in identifying 
the causal effect of CBHI. Demand for health insurance may be driven by affordability or 
latent health status, in which case simple differences in outcomes between CBHI enrolled and 
non-enrolled households may not be viewed as causal effects of the scheme. Tables 2 and 3 
suggest non-random uptake. At baseline, households that subsequently take up CBHI have 
higher crop output and income, are more likely to have borrowed, have larger outstanding 
loans, and larger livestock holdings than households that do not insure. However, we see little 
differences in consumption. A naive comparison of post intervention outcomes would 
overestimate the impact of CBHI on income and livestock and underestimate the impact on 
indebtedness. 
We therefore estimate a household fixed effects model that controls for both observed and 
unobserved time-invariant confounding factors  
itiittitit XTCBHIY         (1) 
where itY  is the outcome of interest for household i  at time t , the dummy variable itCBHI  
indicates whether household i  is insured in year t , and T  reflects year dummy variables for 
each of the three years. Household fixed effects are captured by i  and it is a random error 
term. Time varying controls itX include demographics, various measures of socio-economic 
status, shocks and household head characteristics (see table 3 for a list of covariates). We 
estimate the above equation with and without itX . If the confounding role of time-variant 
10 
 
unobserved characteristics is minimal, then we would expect similar treatment effects across 
these two specifications.
14
 In addition, we also combine the fixed effects approach with 
propensity score matching (PSM). CBHI uptake is modelled as a function of baseline 
characteristics, and we estimate equation (1) only for households on common support.  
We have two groups of control households: uninsured households in pilot districts and 
households from non-pilot districts. Each control group introduces different sources of bias. 
For the pilot districts, the voluntary nature of the scheme could induce selection bias. The 
fixed effects would purge selection effects if these are based on time-invariant characteristics. 
Pilot districts are also prone to spill-over effects. However, these are most likely to be 
relevant to health care use and not for economic outcomes, at least not in the short term.
15
  
The control districts are drawn from the same regions and fulfil the criteria stipulated by 
the government in selecting CBHI districts, while any remaining geographical differences 
will be controlled for by the fixed effects. Although, fixed effects cannot deal with aggregate 
shocks we explicitly control for information on 22 different shock types (natural shock, 
crime/conflict related shock, health shock and economic shock). Our robustness check for 
excluding covariates also tests if the results are sensitive to excluding these shocks. 
Finally, there remains a possible confounding effect from other social programs that share 
targeting and selection criteria with the CBHI pilot. We are aware of only one such social 
safety net program in rural Ethiopia, the PSNP (Productive Safety Net Program). For both 
sets of control households, we estimate models with and without an indicator variable for 
PSNP. 
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 Results without covariates are reported in the appendix, table A1. 
15 We run a placebo test where treatment indicator takes a value of 1 if uninsured household lives in 
pilot district and 0 otherwise. We do not find any indication of spill-over effects. Results are reported 
in the appendix, table A2. 
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6. Estimates 
Table 4 presents treatment effects using different control groups. Across methods we find 
statistically significant positive impact on income (crop output and total income) for the pilot 
district comparison only. While the magnitudes of the estimates decline as we exclude 
households that are off support, we find that crop output and total income increase by ETB 
785 and ETB 1027, respectively or 9 to 10 percent of baseline values. While the coefficients 
are also positive when we use households in non-pilot districts as controls, the estimates are 
not precise. The results provide no evidence that CBHI affects household consumption, as the 
coefficients lack statistical significance and the magnitudes are small. 
We find a negative impact on the probability of having outstanding loans ranging between 
4 to 5 percent, depending on methods and control groups, which translates to about 13 
percent of baseline values.
16
 Figure 1 shows that the source of this effect is a decline in the 
proportion of indebted insured households. There are also negative coefficients for the 
amount of outstanding loans although these are imprecise. Estimates for all types of livestock 
are not statistically significant. 
7. Conclusion 
This paper explored the impact of Ethiopia’s CBHI pilot scheme on household economic 
welfare. We used three rounds of a household panel dataset, which included one baseline and 
two follow-up surveys. We deployed different specifications of a household fixed effects 
model and compared results across different control groups (within and across pilot and non-
pilot districts).  
We found that enrolment in CBHI decreases the probability of indebtedness by about 5 
percentage points. Compared to the proportion of households who were indebted at baseline 
(37.5 percent), this effect corresponds to a 13 percent decline. We found no statistically 
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 The estimates for the pilot-district control group are, however, imprecise. 
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significant impacts on consumption and livestock holdings while there is some evidence that 
CBHI is associated with increases in annual crop output and total income of about 9 to 10 
percent.  
The effects on indebtedness and output/income (although not robust across control groups) 
are consistent with the idea that households with access to CBHI are less likely to rely on 
coping responses such as borrowing and also less likely to divert resources meant for 
productive purposes to finance urgent health care needs.  
Thus, the main benefit of the scheme is its effect on reducing the need to borrow and rely 
on savings. This may have longer-term benefits in reducing vulnerability to other forms of 
shocks. A related study has found a sharp impact on increasing health care utilization 
(Mebratie et al. 2013b). The combined results provide support to the government’s recent 
move to extend the CBHI pilot to a total of 161 districts for further testing. However, a 
nationwide scale up requires an examination of the scheme’s financial sustainability.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
References 
Admassie, A., Abebaw, D. and Woldemichael, A.D. (2009). “Impact Evaluation of the 
Ethiopian Health Service Extension Program” Journal of Development Effectiveness 
1(4): 430-449 
Asfaw, A. and von Braun, J. (2004). “Is Consumption Insured against Illness? Evidence on 
Vulnerability of Households to Health Shocks in Rural Ethiopia.” Economic 
Development and Cultural Change 53(1): 115-129  
Chee, G., Smith, K. and Kapinga, A. (2002). “Assessment of Community Health Fund in 
Hanang District, Tanzania”. The Partners for Health Reformplus Project, Abt 
Associates Inc., Bethesda, MD. 
Dekker, M. and Wilms, A. (2010). “Health Insurance and Other Risk-Coping Strategies in 
Uganda: The Case of Microcare Insurance Ltd.” World Development 38(3): 369-378 
Dercon, S. and Krishnan, P. (1998). “Changes in Poverty in Rural Ethiopia 1989-1995: 
Measurement, Robustness Tests and Decomposition” CSAE WPS/98-7, University of 
Oxford 
Diop, F., Sulzbach, S. and Chankova, S. (2006). “The impact of mutual health organizations 
on social inclusion, access to health care, and household income protection: Evidence 
from Ghana, Senegal, and Mali” PHRplus, Abt Associates Inc, Bethesda. 
Ekman, B. (2004). “Community-Based Health Insurance in Low-Income Countries: A 
Systematic Review of the Evidence”. Health Policy and Planning 19(5): 249-270. 
Flores, G., Krishnakumar, J., O’Donnell, O., and van Doorslaer E. (2008). “Coping with 
Health-Care Costs: Implications for the Measurement of Catastrophic Expenditures 
and Poverty” Health Economics 17(12): 1393-1412 
FMoH (2008). “Health Insurance Strategy”. Federal Ministry of Health Planning and 
Program Department. Addis Ababa. 
14 
 
Genoni, M.E. (2012). “Health Shocks and Consumption Smoothing: Evidence from 
Indonesia” Economic Development and Cultural Change 60 (3): 475-506 
Gertler, P. and Gruber, J. (2002). “ Insuring Consumption Against Illness” The American 
Economic Review 92(1): 51-70 
Heltberg, R. and Lund, N. (2009). “Shocks, Coping and Outcomes for Pakistan’s Poor: 
Health Risks Predominate” Journal of Development Studies 45(6): 889-910 
Islam, A. and Maitra, P. (2012). “Health Shocks and Consumption Smoothing in Rural 
Households: Does Microcredit Have a Role to Play? Journal of Development 
Economics 97(2): 232-243 
Jowett, M., Contoyannis,P. and Vinh, N.D. (2003). “The Impact of Public Voluntary Health 
Insurance on Private Health Expenditure in Vietnam” Social Science and Medicine 56 
(2): 333-342 
Leive, A. and Xu, K. (2008). “Coping with Out-of-Pocket Health Payments: Empirical 
Evidence from 15 African Countries” Bulletin of the World Health Organization 
86(11): 849-856  
Leon, A.S. (2012). “The Cost of Incomplete Consumption Insurance against Health Shocks: 
Evidence from Mexico”. Available on http://paa2013.princeton.edu/papers/131594  
Levine, D., Polimeni, R. And Ramage, I. (2014). “Insuring Health or Insuring Wealth? An 
experimental Evaluation of Health Insurance in Rural Cambodia” IRLE Working 
Paper No.109-14. http://www.irle.berkeley.edu/workingpapers/109-14.pdf    
Levy, H. (2002). “The Economic Consequences of Being Uninsured”. Working Paper 12. 
ERIU 
Lindelow, M. and Wagstaff, A. (2005). “Health Shocks in China: Are The Poor and 
Uninsured Less Protected? World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3740. World 
Bank. 
15 
 
Lu, C., Chin, B., Lewandowski, J.L., Basinga, P., Hirschhorn, L.R., Hill, K., Murray, M. and 
Binagwaho, A. (2012). “Towards Universal Health Coverage: An Evaluation of 
Rwanda Mutuelles in Its First Eight Years” PLoS ONE 7(6): e39282. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039282 
Mebratie, A. D., Sparrow, R.A.,  Alemu, G. and Bedi, A.S. (2013). “Community-Based 
Health Insurance Schemes: A Systematic Review” ISS Working Paper Series/General 
Series. Vol. 568: ISS-EUR 
Mebratie, A., Sparrow, R., Yilma, Z., Abebaw, D., Alemu, G. and Bedi, A.S.  (2013). Impact 
of Ethiopian Pilot Community Based Health Insurance Scheme on Health Care 
Utilization: A Household Panel Data Analysis. The Lancet. 381: S92 
Mohanan, M. (2013). “Causal Effects of Health Shocks on Consumption and Debt: Quasi-
experimental Evidence from Bus Accident Injuries” The Review of Economics and 
Statistics 95(2): 673-681 
Population Census Commission, Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (2008) “Summary 
and Statistical Report of the 2007 Population and Housing Census” Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia.  
Preker, A.S., Carrin, G., Dror, D.M., Jakab, M., Hsiao, W. and Arhin-Tenkorang, D. (2002). 
“Effectiveness of Community Health Financing in Meeting the Cost of Illness”, 
Bulletin of the World Health Organization 80(2): 143-50. 
Shimeles, A. (2010). “Community Based Health Insurance Schemes in Africa: The Case of 
Rwanda” GU Working Papers in Economics 463. Göteborg: Göteborg University.  
Smith, K.V. and Sulzbach, S. (2008). “Community-Based Health Insurance and Access to 
Maternal Health Services: Evidence from Three West African Countries”. Social 
Science & Medicine 66(12): 2460-2473.  
16 
 
Sparrow, R., van de Poel, E., Hadiwidjaja, G., Yumna, A., Warda, N. and Suryahadi, A. 
(2014). “Coping with the Economic Consequences of Ill Health in Indonesia.” Health 
Economics 23(6): 719-728  
Wagstaff, A. (2007). “The Economic Consequences of Health Shocks: Evidence From 
Vietnam.” Journal of Health Economics 26(1): 82-100 
Wagstaff, A. and Lindelow, M. (2010). “Are Health Shocks Different? Evidence From a 
Multi-Shock Survey in Laos” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5335. 
World Bank 
Wagstaff, A. and Pradhan, M. (2005). “Health Insurance Impacts on Health and Nonmedical 
Consumption in a Developing Country” Policy Working Paper Series 3563, The 
World Bank 
Xu, K., Evans, D., Kawabata, K., Zeramdini, R., Klavus, J., and Murray, C.. (2003). 
“Household Catastrophic Health Expenditure: a Multicountry Analysis”. The Lancet 
326(9378): 111-117  
Yilma, Z., Mebratie, A.D., Sparrow, R.A., Abebaw, D., Dekker, M, Alemu, G and Bedi, A.S. 
(2014) “Coping with shocks in rural Ethiopia”. Forthcoming in Journal of 
Development Studies. DOI:10.1080/00220388.2014.909028 
 
  
17 
 
Tables 
 
Table 1. Premium and CBHI uptake per region 
Region Premium per month (ETB) CBHI uptake (%) 
For all core HH 
members 
Per each non-
core HH 
member 
April 2012 April 2013 
Tigray 11 2.5 33.9 50.2 
Oromiya 15 3 44.2 44.5 
SNNPR 10.5 2.1 35.3 35.4 
Amhara 3 per any member 49.5 62.7 
Total   40.7 48.2 
Notes: A one-time registration fee of ETB 5.00 apply for all households; Payment interval: 
Tigray (annual), Amhara (biannual), Oromiya (annual or biannual), SNNPR (three times a 
year or quarterly). Core household members include parents and their children below the age 
of 18. 
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Table 2. Baseline differences in outcome variables: insured vs non-insured 
 Insured 
households 
Non-insured households  
 All districts Pilot districts Control districts 
 (N=656) (N=911) (N=527) (N=384) 
Income     
Crop output 8499.0 
(9104.3) 
5985.0*** 
(7044.6) 
6551.3*** 
(7440.0) 
5212.8*** 
(6395.8) 
Total income 10017.2 
(9828.0) 
7091.8*** 
(7335.5) 
7757.6*** 
(8089.1) 
6196.2*** 
(6075.1) 
Consumption     
Total 244.7 
(146.9) 
249.4 
(170.4) 
241.9 
(162.5) 
259.6 
(180.5) 
Food 201.1 
(125.4) 
206.3 
(144.6) 
200.6 
(144.8) 
214.0 
(144.3) 
Non-food 43.8 
(39.6) 
43.0 
(45.1) 
41.2 
(37.7) 
45.5 
(53.6) 
Indebtedness     
Outstanding loan (%) 37.5 
(48.4) 
26.0*** 
(43.9) 
26.6*** 
(44.2) 
25.3*** 
(43.5) 
Total outstanding loan 880.3 
(1689.2) 
527.6*** 
(1259.3) 
492.8*** 
(1172.7) 
575.4*** 
(1369.5) 
Livestock     
Goats  # 1.2 
(5.3) 
0.8** 
(2.2) 
0.7** 
(2.2) 
0.8 
(2.1) 
Sheep # 1.8 
(3.0) 
1.0*** 
(2.6) 
0.9*** 
(2.2) 
1.2*** 
(3.0) 
Bulls # 0.4 
(1.4) 
0.3** 
(0.7) 
0.3* 
(0.6) 
0.3** 
(0.7) 
Calves # 0.8 
(1.2) 
0.6*** 
(0.9) 
0.6*** 
(0.9) 
0.5*** 
(0.8) 
Oxen # 1.4 
(1.3) 
0.8*** 
(1.0) 
0.9*** 
(1.0) 
0.8*** 
(0.9) 
Notes: Columns 1-4 report mean (standard deviation; Statistical significance refers to 
differences in means between the control group and the insured households: *** 0.01, ** 
0.05, * 0.1. Crop output refers to total value of production in the past one year. Total income 
is the sum of crop output and off-farm income. All livestock types refer to number of 
livestock owned. All monetary values are in Ethiopian Birr (ETB). 
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Table 3. Baseline differences in covariates: insured vs non-insured 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Insured 
households 
(N=656) 
All non-insured 
households 
(N=911) 
Non-insured in 
pilot districts 
(N=527) 
Non-insured in 
control districts 
(N=384) 
P-value 
Ho: (1=2) 
P-value 
Ho: (1=3) 
P-value 
Ho: (1=4) 
 Mean St.dev Mean St. dev Mean St. dev Mean St. dev 
Health measures            
Head ADL Index 0.044 (0.136) 0.054 (0.151) 0.063 (0.167) 0.042 (0.124) 0.181 0.033 0.792 
Any illness 46.8 (49.9) 46.9 (49.9) 51.2 (50.0) 40.9 (49.2) 0.977 0.130 0.064 
Any chronic illness 16.3 (37.0) 17.1 (37.7) 20.3 (40.3) 12.8 (33.4) 0.671 0.076 0.122 
Any paralysis 4.9 (21.6) 3.4 (18.1) 4.4 (20.4) 2.1 (14.3) 0.143 0.677 0.024 
Any poor/very poor SAH 15.9 (36.6) 11.9 (32.3) 15.4 (36.1) 7.0 (25.6) 0.022 0.820 0.000 
Covariates            
Head does not work 1.2 (11.0) 1.9 (13.5) 1.7 (13.0) 2.1 (14.3) 0.314 0.484 0.275 
Head farmer (%) 93.6 (24.5) 87.5 (33.1) 91.3 (28.3) 82.3 (38.2) 0.000 0.130 0.000 
Head domestic worker 
(%) 
2.6 (15.9) 5.7 (23.2) 3.6 (18.7) 8.6 (28.1) 0.003 0.313 0.000 
Head other employment 
(%) 
2.6 (15.9) 4.9 (21.7) 3.4 (18.2) 7.0 (25.6) 0.019 0.406 0.001 
PSNP  member (%) 25.8 (43.8) 20.9 (40.7) 10.3 (30.5) 35.2 (47.8) 0.022 0.000 0.001 
Asset quintile 1 (%) 10.5 (30.7) 24.9 (43.3) 23.3 (42.3) 27.1 (44.5) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Asset quintile 2 (%) 15.5 (36.3) 23.3 (42.3) 22.2 (41.6) 24.7 (43.2) 0.000 0.003 0.000 
Asset quintile 3 (%) 19.4 (39.5) 21.2 (40.9) 21.1 (40.8) 21.4 (41.0) 0.377 0.468 0.439 
Asset quintile 4 (%) 23.9 (42.7) 17.8 (38.3) 18.2 (38.6) 17.2 (37.8) 0.003 0.017 0.011 
Asset quintile 5 (%) 30.6 (46.1) 12.8 (33.5) 15.2 (35.9) 9.6 (29.5) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Social capital (%)
a
 40.5 (49.1) 35.6 (47.9) 34.4 (47.6) 37.2 (48.4) 0.051 0.033 0.306 
Head is male (%) 88.1 (32.4) 85.6 (35.1) 86.1 (34.6) 84.9 (35.9) 0.153 0.315 0.138 
Head age 47.3 (13.1) 45.6 (14.5) 46.4 (14.7) 44.5 (14.2) 0.022 0.319 0.001 
Head has no education 
(%) 
43.1 (49.6) 48.5 (50.0) 48.8 (50.0) 48.2 (50.0) 0.032 0.050 0.109 
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Head education informal 
(%) 
15.9 (36.6) 11.2 (31.5) 10.2 (30.4) 12.5 (33.1) 0.007 0.005 0.137 
Head education primary 
(%) 
36.9 (48.3) 35.8 (48.0) 35.9 (48.0) 35.7 (48.0) 0.637 0.701 0.682 
Head education secondary 
or more (%) 
4.1 (19.9) 4.5 (20.7) 5.1 (22.1) 3.6 (18.8) 0.717 0.413 0.704 
Head Muslim (%) 18.8 (39.1) 32.5 (46.9) 17.1 (37.7) 53.6 (49.9) 0.000 0.457 0.000 
Head Orthodox (%) 64.6 (47.8) 41.9 (49.4) 54.1 (49.9) 25.3 (43.5) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Head Protestant (%) 15.7 (36.4) 22.2 (41.6) 25.6 (43.7) 17.4 (38.0) 0.001 0.000 0.463 
Head other 
Christian/religion (%) 
0.9 (9.5) 3.4 (18.1) 3.2 (17.7) 3.6 (18.8) 0.001 0.004 0.002 
Log HH size 1.7 (0.4) 1.6 (0.4) 1.7 (0.5) 1.6 (0.4) 0.000 0.004 0.001 
Male (age<=5) share % 6.5 (10.4) 7.9 (12.1) 7.5 (11.8) 8.5 (12.6) 0.017 0.124 0.007 
Female (age<=5) share % 6.5 (10.4) 8.1 (12.4) 7.4 (11.4) 8.9 (13.6) 0.010 0.165 0.001 
Male [6 18] share (%) 21.7 (17.1) 19.0 (17.1) 19.0 (16.8) 19.0 (17.6) 0.002 0.007 0.014 
Female [6 18] share (%) 19.2 (15.9) 18.5 (16.3) 18.7 (16.1) 18.3 (16.7) 0.437 0.604 0.410 
Male [19 45] share (%) 15.3 (13.0) 16.0 (13.6) 16.1 (13.8) 15.8 (13.3) 0.336 0.320 0.558 
Female [19 45] share (%) 16.3 (11.7) 16.1 (11.4) 16.2 (12.0) 16.0 (10.6) 0.724 0.846 0.671 
Male [46 60] share (%) 4.6 (8.3) 3.8 (7.6) 3.6 (7.2) 4.1 (8.0) 0.045 0.026 0.328 
Female [46 60] share (%) 5.3 (11.6) 4.8 (12.1) 5.0 (11.9) 4.6 (12.3) 0.420 0.640 0.345 
Male [60+] share (%) 3.3 (9.4) 3.0 (9.3) 3.5 (10.2) 2.3 (8.0) 0.579 0.673 0.092 
Female [60+] share (%) 1.2 (7.2) 2.8 (11.4) 3.0 (12.2) 2.5 (10.3) 0.002 0.002 0.022 
Health shock (%) 32.1 (46.7) 31.2 (46.3) 37.0 (48.3) 23.2 (42.3) 0.710 0.075 0.002 
Crime/conflict shock (%) 5.6 (23.1) 7.7 (26.6) 8.9 (28.5) 6.0 (23.8) 0.116 0.030 0.820 
Economic shock (%) 37.7 (48.5) 30.3 (46.0) 36.2 (48.1) 22.1 (41.6) 0.002 0.604 0.000 
Natural shock (%) 45.5 (49.8) 49.0 (50.0) 49.3 (50.0) 48.4 (50.0) 0.176 0.189 0.359 
Notes: Columns 1-4 report mean and standard deviation. P-values for tests of differences in means are reported in columns 5-7; 
a
 social capital 
takes the value of 1 if the household has someone to rely on at times of difficulties. 
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Table 4. Welfare effects of CBHI 
 FE with covariates FE with covariates after matching 
 All 
districts 
control 
districts 
Pilot 
districts 
All 
districts 
control 
districts 
Pilot 
districts 
Income       
Crop output 459.9 286.6 816.4* 418.6 243.8 785.4* 
 (477.4) (572.4) (460.7) (481.8) (573.8) (470.1) 
Total income 675.7 427.8 1,092* 593.9 338.2 1,027* 
 (571.3) (632.7) (593.6) (577.3) (633.7) (604.2) 
Consumption       
Total 18.01 25.03 12.38 -6.556 -1.874 -14.96 
 (27.45) (30.75) (33.02) (21.34) (24.82) (26.35) 
Food  18.59 26.94 10.87 -5.655 0.405 -16.18 
 (26.70) (29.95) (32.25) (20.67) (23.92) (25.68) 
Non-food 0.113 -1.044 2.436 0.0201 -1.285 2.467 
 (2.969) (3.581) (3.166) (3.047) (3.748) (3.228) 
Indebtedness       
Loan (0/1) -0.0506** -0.0540** -0.0340 -0.0483** -0.0484** -0.0341 
 (0.0222) (0.0237) (0.0238) (0.0225) (0.0235) (0.0243) 
Loan amount -44.87 -51.24 -16.72 -36.24 -38.18 -10.62 
 (69.76) (77.20) (70.32) (70.81) (77.93) (71.84) 
Livestock       
Goats # -0.0835 -0.0357 -0.129 -0.0836 -0.0247 -0.136 
 (0.141) (0.124) (0.151) (0.145) (0.127) (0.156) 
Sheep # -0.0321 0.0237 -0.0808 -0.0336 0.0205 -0.0808 
 (0.113) (0.129) (0.114) (0.114) (0.130) (0.115) 
Bull # 0.0453 0.0421 0.0247 0.0458 0.0447 0.0209 
 (0.0362) (0.0415) (0.0349) (0.0368) (0.0425) (0.0356) 
Calves # -0.0177 -0.0360 -0.00440 -0.0210 -0.0380 -0.00400 
 (0.0631) (0.0547) (0.0647) (0.0644) (0.0562) (0.0664) 
Oxen # 0.0451 0.0590 0.0286 0.0439 0.0574 0.0277 
 (0.0452) (0.0480) (0.0467) (0.0464) (0.0495) (0.0483) 
Notes: The column headings refer to the choice of control group: all districts (all non-insured 
households included), control districts (only non-insured households in control districts 
included), and pilot districts (only non-insured households in pilot districts included). 
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the village level. Results are broadly similar 
when excluding the time-varying covariates. A list of covariates is given in table 3. In the 
case of livestock we exclude the asset index quintiles as the index includes number of 
livestock. Range of number of observations: first column (4230-4665), second column (2816-
3101), third column (3153-3520), fourth column (4059-4483), fifth column (2722-3003), 
sixth column (3053-3412). 66 out of 1548 observations are outside the common support 
region [0.086-0.869]. 
Statistical significance: *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.1. 
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Figure 1. (Selected) outcome variables by insurance status across years
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Appendix 
Table A1. Welfare effects of CBHI (robustness to excluding covariates) 
 FE before matching FE after matching 
 All 
districts 
control 
districts 
Pilot 
districts 
All 
districts 
control 
districts 
Pilot 
districts 
Income       
Crop output 673.6 497.8 1,105** 670.2 474.1 1,112** 
 (476.8) (577.5) (466.0) (481.7) (576.5) (477.6) 
Total income 971.6* 755.7 1,484** 942.1 695.2 1,466** 
 (564.7) (631.3) (587.8) (571.3) (631.8) (600.5) 
Consumption       
Total 25.59 24.98 20.34 -1.546 -3.115 -8.523 
 (28.75) (33.50) (32.68) (20.81) (26.83) (24.99) 
Food  26.35 27.59 19.39 -0.494 -0.301 -9.072 
 (27.86) (32.57) (31.65) (19.87) (25.83) (23.97) 
Non-food 0.210 -1.143 2.167 0.206 -1.137 2.136 
 (2.907) (3.451) (3.075) (2.986) (3.606) (3.131) 
Indebtedness       
Loan (0/1) -0.0539** -0.0572** -0.0412* -0.0526** -0.0537** -0.0417* 
 (0.0221) (0.0237) (0.0237) (0.0221) (0.0231) (0.0240) 
Loan amount -43.50 -39.48 -29.20 -38.95 -31.77 -24.24 
 (70.60) (78.52) (72.77) (70.79) (78.63) (73.35) 
Livestock       
Goats # -0.0801 -0.00357 -0.111 -0.0820 0.00597 -0.122 
 (0.145) (0.126) (0.157) (0.149) (0.129) (0.162) 
Sheep # -0.0434 0.0190 -0.0817 -0.0430 0.0176 -0.0808 
 (0.114) (0.132) (0.113) (0.116) (0.135) (0.115) 
Bull # 0.0445 0.0368 0.0285 0.0471 0.0399 0.0285 
 (0.0352) (0.0398) (0.0343) (0.0357) (0.0410) (0.0343) 
Calves # 0.00694 -0.00756 0.0164 -0.000696 -0.0150 0.0111 
 (0.0634) (0.0583) (0.0631) (0.0649) (0.0596) (0.0649) 
Oxen # 0.0558 0.0723 0.0439 0.0559 0.0749 0.0418 
 (0.0474) (0.0514) (0.0476) (0.0484) (0.0526) (0.0487) 
Notes: The column headings refer to the choice of control group: all districts (all non-insured 
households included), control districts (only non-insured households in control districts 
included), and pilot districts (only non-insured households in pilot districts included). 
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the village level. Range of number of 
observations: first column (4265-4707), second column (2837-3126), third column (3181-
3555), fourth column (4080-4510), fifth column (2734-3019), sixth column (3068-3433). 66 
out of 1548 observations are outside the common support region [0.086-0.869]. 
Statistical significance: *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.1. 
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Table A2. Placebo Test: (Treatment=1 if uninsured lives in pilot district, 0 otherwise) 
 Coefficients 
(St. errors) 
Income  
Crop output -460.3 
 (558.0) 
Total income -637.2 
 (663.1) 
Consumption  
Total -4.244 
 (21.75) 
Food  -1.333 
 (20.38) 
Non-food -2.904 
 (3.091) 
Indebtedness  
Loan (0/1) -0.0176 
 (0.0213) 
Loan amount -34.51 
 (95.76) 
Livestock  
Goats # 0.0366 
 (0.0888) 
Sheep # 0.134 
 (0.145) 
Bull # 0.0268 
 (0.0384) 
Calves # 0.0250 
 (0.0402) 
Oxen # 0.000696 
 (0.0391) 
Notes: All estimates are based on OLS regression of change in outcome variables, controlling 
for covariates (given in table 3) and time dummy. In the case of livestock we exclude the 
asset index quintiles as the index includes number of livestock. Standard errors (in 
parentheses) are clustered at the village level. Number of observations ranges from 1561 to 
1805. 
Statistical significance: *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.1. 
